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SHOULD COMPENSATION SCHEMES BE 
BASED ON THE PROBABILITY OF 
CAUSATION OR EXPECTED YEARS OF LIFE 
LOST? 
James Robins* 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this essay is to give a succinct and accessible 
summary of why I believe that compensation in tort suits should be 
based not on probability of causation but rather on years (or 
quality-years) of life lost.1 I only consider cases in which the 
plaintiff claims that a hazardous exposure some years in the past is 
the cause of a current medical illness, such as cancer or heart 
disease. As I understand it, current legal standards hold that a 
judgment should favor the plaintiff if and only if “it is more 
probable than not” that the exposure “causally contributed to” or 
“was a substantial contributing factor” to her disease.2 This 
standard is often expressed as the requirement that the “probability 
of causation” exceed ½, where the “probability of causation” (PC) 
is the probability that the exposure causally contributed to the 
development of the individual’s disease. It has been suggested that 
                                                          
 * Harvard School of Public Health. 
1 For complete scientific, mathematical, and philosophical arguments for 
this position, see Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, Epidemiology, Justice, 
and the Probability of Causation, 40 JURIMETRICS 321 (1999); James M. Robins 
& Sander Greenland, Estimability and Estimation of Expected Years of Life Lost 
Due to a Hazardous Exposure, 10 STAT. MED. 79 (1991); James M. Robins & 
Sander Greenland, The Probability of Causation under Stochastic Model for 
Individual Risk, 45 BIOMETRICS 1125 (1989). 
2 L.A. Bailey et. al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 168-69 (FED. JUDICIAL CTR. ED. (1994). 
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this standard can be operationalized via the formula 
PC= (RR-1)/RR 
(formula (1)), where RR is the rate ratio (equivalently, relative 
risk) calculated from epidemiologic data comparing the disease 
rate in a cohort of individuals exposed to the hazard to that in an 
unexposed cohort. If one plugs a value of 2 for the rate ratio into 
formula (1) one obtains:  
 PC=(2-1)/2=1/2 
On the basis of this calculation, it has been argued that 
whenever the rate of disease in the exposed cohort is less than 
twice the rate in the unexposed (so the rate ratio is less than two), 
PC must be less than ½ and thus the tort claim is without merit. 
I. IS THE PROBABILITY OF CAUSATION ESTIMABLE FROM 
EPIDEMIOLOGIC DATA 
But is formula (1) correct? For if not, the above argument fails. 
I will now show that formula (1) may be incorrect even if the rate 
ratio is based on data from an ideal epidemiologic study with an 
enormous sample. Specifically we will suppose we have data from 
a (hypothetical) very large well conducted randomized trial. A very 
large well-conducted randomized trial represents an ideal 
epidemiologic study because, in a large study, randomization 
guarantees that there is no confounding by unrecorded common 
causes of the exposure and disease: exposure is only determined by 
the flip of a coin and a coin flip does not cause disease. Indeed, in 
a large randomized study of 2n subjects, one can view 
randomization as producing n pairs of carbon copies with respect 
to the disease outcome of interest, with exactly one copy in each 
pair being exposed and the other being unexposed. That is, if one 
member of the pair would get the disease at age 50 when exposed, 
and at age 60 when unexposed, then the same is true for her carbon 
copy. This statement is more than mere metaphor. Specifically, it 
is a mathematical theorem that this statement becomes closer and 
closer to being precisely correct as the size of the trial increases, 
and furthermore any logical conclusion one draws concerning the 
results of a large randomized trial under the assumption that each 
exposed person has an exact unexposed carbon copy (with respect 
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to disease outcome) will be a valid conclusion. This theorem gives 
readers without advanced mathematical training a license to use 
the carbon copy assumption as a walking stick or crutch (as needs 
be) to aid them in analyzing a large trial. 
Thus armed with our crutch, let us analyze a trial. Table 1 
presents the data on a representative subset of size 10 from a 
hypothetical large randomized trial in which at age 20, 500,000 
subjects are randomized to the purported hazardous exposure and 
five hundred thousand subjects remain unexposed. To keep matters 
simple the disease outcome is death from any cause and all 
subjects are followed to extinction. In Table 1 the 5 exposed 
subjects die at ages 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80 while the five unexposed 
die at ages 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90. We will suppose the data on the 
total 1,000,000 subjects is just 100,000 copies of Table 1, in order 
to spare us keeping track of 1,000,000 different individuals. The 
rate ratio in Table 1 is by definition the death rate in the exposed 
divided by the death rate in the unexposed. To calculate the death 
rate in the exposed, we divided the number of deaths in the 
exposed (5) by the total number of years lived by exposed subjects 
(beginning at age 20 when the study began). Thus the rate in the 
exposed is 5/( 20 +30 + 40 + 50 + 60)= 5/200 deaths per year and 
the rate in the unexposed is 5/(30 + 40 +50+60+70) = 5/250 deaths 
per year. Thus the overall rate ratio is 5/200 divided by 5/250 
which is 1.25. Thus if we use formula (1) to calculate the 
probability of causation, we obtain PC = (1.25-1)/1.25 = 0.2 = 1/5 
which is less than ½ and thus no compensation would be awarded 
to the plaintiff. 
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TABLE 1—AGE AT DEATH FOR 10 STUDY SUBJECTS 
 
Age in years 
Death rate in 
deaths/year 
 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90  
 5 exposed 
subjects 
    1  1  1  1  1   5/200 
 
 5 unexposed 
subjects 
    1  1  1  1  1  5/250 
RR = 5/200   =  1.25              RR = (1.25-1)  =   0.2 
                                   5/250                                        1.25 
                 
Let us now see if formula (1) gave the correct answer. To do so 
we will use the carbon copy assumption but before doing so we 
must think a bit more about just what the assumption entails. 
Consider a given exposed subject, Helen, who is observed to die at 
age 60. Helen would have died at some unknown age x if she had 
been randomized to non-exposure. Under the carbon copy 
assumption we are assured that, among the unexposed subjects in 
Table 1, there is a carbon copy for Helen who dies at exactly the 
age x that Helen would have died if unexposed. But, since we do 
not know x, we cannot determine which of the unexposed persons 
is Helen’s carbon copy. We conclude that although we may 
assume each exposed person has an unexposed carbon copy, 
nonetheless the data collected in the trial provides absolutely no 
information as to which unexposed person is the carbon copy of a 
given exposed person. Thus there are many possibilities consistent 
with the trial data in Table 1. 
Table 2a shows one such possibility. In the table, carbon copies 
are linked by arrows. According to this linkage, four of the five 
exposed individuals would have died at the same age had they 
been unexposed, while the fifth exposed person died prematurely 
due to her exposure. Thus the probability of causation is 1/5, which 
agrees with that obtained using formula (1). If a PC of 0.5 was the 
mandated legal cutoff, the judge would have been correct in his 
decision to dismiss the suit based on formula (1).  
[Technical note: The perceptive reader might disagree by 
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arguing as follows. If (i) the judge believed that the PC was 1/5 in 
the exposed population and thus that exactly one of the five 
exposed subjects was harmed by exposure and (ii) from the study 
data in Table 1, the judge had no way of knowing which of the 5 
exposed subjects was the subject who died prematurely, he would 
be correct in assigning a probability of causation of 1/5 to each and 
thus in dismissing the suit. But in fact, given (i), the judge can 
logically deduce from the data in Table 1 that the exposed person 
who died at 40 must be the individual harmed and thus that (ii) is 
false. As a consequence the judge should have concluded that PC 
for the 4 other exposed subjects was zero, but that PC was one for 
the subject dying at 40 and therefore the latter subject should have 
been compensated. However, although (ii) is false in our highly 
simplified and stylized example in which all subjects die at one of 
6 distinct ages and the earliest death age in the exposed is strictly 
less than in the unexposed, nonetheless (ii) will be true in a 
realistic study. This is because in a realistic study both the exposed 
and unexposed study subjects will have a positive (albeit small and 
different) probability of dying at any age. As a consequence, given 
(i), in a realistic study, the judge is correct to dismiss the suit.]  
 
TABLE 2A—AGE AT DEATH FOR 10 STUDY SUBJECTS—ARROWS 
LINK CARBON COPIES 
 
Age in years Death rate in 
deaths/year 
 20 30 40 
 
 
50 60 70 80 
 
 
90  
5 exposed 
subjects 
  1 1 1 1  1   5/200 
 
 
5 unexposed 
subjects 
   1 1 1  1 1 5/250 
 
Probability of causation  1/5 =.2  
Total years of life lost due to exposure  =  1 x 50  =  50 
 
However Table 2b considers a second possible carbon copy 
linkage that, like Table 2a, is also consistent with the data in Table 
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1. Under this possibility, each exposed individual died ten years 
prematurely due to her exposure. Thus the probability that 
exposure was a substantial contributing factor to an exposed 
subject’s death is 5/5=1, since it contributed to every exposed 
subject’s demise. Since the PC is 1, we conclude under this carbon 
copy linkage scenario, the quantity 1/5 calculated using formula 
(1) is not the PC and the judge’s ruling to dismiss the case was in 
error. 
 
TABLE 2B—AGE AT DEATH FOR 10 STUDY SUBJECTS—
ARROWS LINK CARBON COPIES 
 
 
 
Age in years 
Death 
rate in 
deaths/ 
year 
 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90  
5 exposed 
subjects 
  1 1 1 1 1  5/200 
 
 
5 unexposed 
subjects 
   1 1 1 1 1 5/250 
 
Probability of causation = 1.0 
Total years of life lost due to exposure = 5 x 10 = 50 
 
This example has taught us that epidemiologic data, even ideal 
epidemiologic data such as that in Table 1, although sufficient to 
determine the rate ratio is not sufficient to determine the 
probability of causation. The probability of causation is not in 
general given by formula (1). Rather its magnitude depends 
critically on which unexposed person is each particular exposed 
person’s carbon copy and the data provide absolutely no 
information on the matter. Indeed, whenever the rate ratio exceeds 
1.0, the data will always be consistent with a carbon copy linkage 
scenario analogous to Table 2b in which exposure contributes to 
each exposed subject’s death and thus the PC is 1. Therefore an 
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epidemiologist who testifies (as many have) that PC is given by 
formula (1) is either giving false testimony or has failed to read 
and/or understand the published literature, since the relevant 
papers refuting formula (1) were published over 15 years ago in 
leading epidemiologic, biostatistical, and risk analysis journals. 
II. EXPECTED YEARS OF LIFE LOST AND COMPENSATION 
Since the probability of causation cannot be determined from 
even ideal epidemiologic data, how should compensation claims be 
adjudicated? Let us return to Tables 2a and 2b but now, let us 
calculate the total number of years of life lost (YLL) due to the 
exposure. Under the carbon copy linkage scenario of Table 2a, the 
YLL due to exposure is 50, the entire loss being suffered by a 
single individual. Under the scenario in Table 2b the YLL is also 
50, 10 years being lost by each one of the five exposed subjects. 
These calculations are an example of a general phenomenon. In a 
large ideal epidemiologic study, one can accurately determine the 
total number of years of life lost due to exposure because the total 
YLL depend only on the data and not on the unknown carbon copy 
linkage scheme. On the other hand neither the probability of 
causation nor the correct apportionment of the total number of 
YLL among the exposed subjects can be empirically determined 
from the data, since both depend on the unknown and empirically 
unverifiable true carbon copy linkage scheme. 
Nonetheless, I believe that awards in compensation cases 
should be proportional to expected years of life lost calculated 
under some reasonable agreed upon linkage scheme. Only in this 
way will the award system serve the public health and “law and 
economics” goal of providing rational properly-calibrated 
economic incentives for defendants to avoid exposing plaintiffs to 
hazardous substances. Specifically, under such an award scheme, 
and given good epidemiologic data, the total payment made by the 
defendant to the plaintiffs will be proportional to the total number 
of YLL (and thereby does not depend on the chosen carbon copy 
linkage scheme). The defendant then appropriately pays for each 
year of life that he has cost the plaintiffs, providing a clear 
incentive to minimize years of life lost. Under this scheme, the 
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remaining question is how to divide the total award to the plaintiff 
class among the individual plaintiffs. This must be negotiated 
within the class because the distribution of YLL among the class 
members cannot be empirically determined even from ideal 
epidemiologic data, as the distribution depends on the unknown 
true carbon copy linkage scheme. 
The true carbon copy linkage scheme is determined by the 
unknown biological mechanisms (at the sub-cellular and genetic 
level) by which exposure causes disease.  
III. FURTHER PROBLEMS WITH COMPENSATION BASED ON THE 
PROBABILITY OF CAUSATION 
Suppose, contrary to fact, we could determine the PC from 
epidemiologic data via formula (1). Even then a compensation 
scheme that pays in proportion to years of life lost would be much 
preferable to one that only compensates plaintiffs whose PC 
exceeds ½ (or equivalently that RR exceeds 2). To see why 
consider the workers at a nuclear facility. If “RR greater than 2” 
were the legal doctrine, companies would have no incentive to 
decrease the amount of daily radiation exposure sustained by the 
workforce. Instead the companies’ incentive would be to rotate or 
replace workers just before their cumulative exposure was large 
enough for RR to exceed 2. Indeed such a rotation policy is 
common in the nuclear industry. If the cancer response to radiation 
is linear in accumulated dose and without a threshold, then rotation 
saves the company compensation costs at the expense of workers 
lives. Specifically the total number of deaths caused by radiation 
exposure would depend only on the total radiation dose received 
by the worker population (regardless of the dose per worker). Thus 
rotation has no effect on the number of radiation-induced deaths. It 
only serves to distribute those radiation-attributable deaths over a 
larger worker population, allowing the company to avoid paying 
any compensation. This is disastrous public health policy. 
Even compensation schemes that would pay in proportion to 
the probability of causation (without a threshold of ½ ) have a 
serious problem with fairness. Under such a payment scheme, the 
estate of a 40-year old and of an 80-year old would be equally 
ROBINSTRYINGTOFIXPDF.DOC 5/4/2004 10:52 AM 
 BASIS FOR COMPENSATION SCHEMES 545 
compensated for the same probability of causation. But the forty 
year old has suffered a greater loss, because the 40-year old had 
some 45 years of expected life cut short by her exposure, while the 
80-year old had less than 10. This examples points to the fact that 
even if one wanted to use probability of causation to determine 
culpability, damages should be assessed in terms of expected years 
(or quality years ) of life lost. 
IV. A BACKDOOR INTO COMPENSATION BASED ON EXPECTED 
YEARS OF LIFE LOST 
Therefore, consider a compensation scheme that mandates an 
award proportional to the expected number of years of life lost on 
the hypothesis that exposure to the defendant’s product caused the 
plaintiff’s death (i.e., the damages) multiplied by the probability of 
culpability (i.e, by the probability the hypothesis is true). This 
probability is, of course, precisely the probability of causation. To 
implement this scheme one must assume a particular empirically 
unverifiable carbon copy linkage scheme. It can be proved that this 
compensation scheme is mathematically equivalent to simply 
paying in proportion to overall expected years of life lost under the 
assumed carbon copy linkage scheme. It therefore follows from 
our earlier discussion that the total damages paid by the defendant 
will be proportional to the total years of life lost due to the 
hazardous exposure and will not depend on the particular carbon 
copy linkage scheme. Indeed this conceptual separation of the 
award into a product of a damages part proportional to expected 
years of life lost (on the hypothesis that exposure to the 
defendant’s product caused the plaintiff’s death)  times a 
culpability part proportional to the probability of causation may be 
a politically attractive approach to pushing for change in the 
current compensation policy in the direction of a more rational 
policy that pays in proportion to years of life lost. 
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V. THE PROBABILITY OF CAUSATION VERSUS YEARS OF LIFE 
LOST: SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
I have argued that award schemes that pay in proportion to 
years of life lost are economically rational but that award schemes 
based on probability of causation are not. More generally, expected 
years of life lost is a more informative summary of exposure effect 
than the probability of causation, since it takes into account when 
(instead of just whether) exposure caused the death. Despite these 
advantages of years of life lost, in certain settings there may be 
ethical, social, or legal reasons for preferring to base compensation 
on the probability of causation. 
A. Example 1 
Suppose two apparently healthy 40-year old men were killed 
instantly when the brakes of a car in which they were traveling 
failed due to a manufacturing error. Upon autopsy, one of the men 
was found to have undiagnosed metastatic lung cancer. The second 
had no underlying medical illness. If compensation is to be paid in 
proportion to the probability of causation, then full compensation 
would be paid to the estates of both men, since the probability is 1 
that their deaths were due to brake failure. On the other hand, if 
compensation is to be paid in proportion to years of life lost, the 
man with the metastatic lung cancer would receive much less 
compensation than the man with no underlying illness. It is clear 
that one could raise legal, ethical, and social questions as to the 
propriety of differentially compensating the families of the two 
men in this setting. 
Examples such as this show that choice of a measure can 
involve issues beyond science, public health, or mathematics. To 
further illustrate the sort of legal, social, and ethical questions 
brought out by this example, consider the following modification. 
B. Example 2 
Suppose in the previous example that the first man had in fact a 
recently diagnosed localized peripheral lung cancer for which he 
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was to be operated on in one week’s time (instead of undiagnosed 
metastatic lung cancer). Medical experts had given him a 60 
percent chance of a complete cure and a 40 percent chance of death 
from metastatic disease within 5 years. Should the damages 
assessed against the car manufacture be less for the first rather than 
the second man if the first man had a 40 percent chance of being 
dead of lung cancer in 5 years? What if, one year later, a cure for 
the dead person’s cancer was discovered? 
VI. NON IDEAL EPIDEMIOLOGIC DATA 
Heretofore, I have assumed that data from a large ideal 
epidemiologic study are available. In practice, sample sizes may 
not be large and there may be unquantified biases due to 
uncontrolled confounding, misclassification, and measurement 
error. These sources of uncertainty add greatly to the difficulty and 
complexity of evaluating epidemiologic data for one can no longer 
assume that the empirical rate ratio, calculated from the 
epidemiologic data is equal to the rate ratio that would be found in 
a large well-conducted randomized trial. This latter rate ratio we 
will call the causal rate ratio. I conclude by briefly discussing the 
consequences of having less than ideal epidemiologic data. 
When assessing causality, epidemiologists measure the 
strength of association by the empirical rate ratio: the ratio of then 
rate of disease in the exposed to that in the unexposed. If the rate 
ratio is 10 or greater it is hard-to-imagine unmeasured risk factors 
or unconsidered biases could be responsible. On the other hand, if 
the empirical rate ratio is 1.2, it is relatively easy to suppose that 
unmeasured confounders or uncontrolled biases could explain the 
association and therefore that the causal rate ratio is 1. This is true 
even if the study population were of sufficient size to produce 
narrow confidence intervals for the empirical rate ratio (e.g., (1.1, 
1.3)) and an extreme p-value (e.g., p < 0.001). 
Unfortunately, the public health benefits of controlling 
(regulating) exposure are best measured in terms of the number of 
lives saved (or the amount of serious morbidity prevented) per 
thousand individuals exposed multiplied by the expected number 
of years of additional life per life saved (which, in total, is the YLL 
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from failing to regulate the exposure). The number of lives saved is 
proportional to the causal rate difference rather than the causal rate 
ratio. 
To help understand the public health implications of these facts 
consider the following example. The death rate from coronary 
heart disease (CHD) is over 200 times that of soft tissue sarcoma. 
Thus, a causal rate ratio of 1.2 for CHD corresponds to a much 
larger causal rate difference than a causal rate ratio of 15 for soft 
tissue sarcoma [since 200×(1.2-1)=40 is approximately three times 
greater than (15-1)=14]. Therefore, it is far more important to 
regulate an exposure associated with a causal rate ratio of 1.2 for 
CHD than an exposure associated with a causal rate ratio of 15 for 
soft tissue sarcoma. However, if the causal rate ratio for CHD is 
1.2, it is likely that the empirical rate ratio will be less than 1.5 in 
any study with sufficient power. In such circumstances, it will not 
be possible to reach a scientific consensus that the true causal rate 
ratio is greater than 1 because of concerns about unquantified 
potential biases. In contrast consensus would exist that the causal 
rate ratio for soft tissue sarcoma is greater than 1. Therefore the 
exposure which actually takes far fewer lives would be 
preferentially regulated. Similarly, the infrequent exposure-caused 
deaths from soft tissue sarcoma would be compensated in the 
courts while the more frequent exposure-caused deaths from CHD 
would go uncompensated.  
It follows that an improved tort system will never, in itself, 
succeed in adequately protecting the public health; one must also 
regulate exposure to substances that, based on current evidence, 
are suspected of being harmful, even in the absence of scientific 
consensus as to harm. 
